Lessons from the Russian Meltdown: The Economics of Soft Legal Constraints

On August 17, 1998, Russia defaulted on its domestic public debt, declared a moratorium on the private banks' foreign liabilities, which was equivalent to an outright default, and abandoned its exchange rate regime. The depth of the Russian meltdown shocked the international markets, and precipitated a period of serious financial instability. It is important to understand the roots of such a crisis to learn about possible lessons on both issues of bank supervision and international stability. While the visible cause of the crisis was an unsustainable fiscal deficit couples with massive capital flight, the critical question concerns the origin of such circumstances. This paper argues that the structure of individual incentives in the Russian legal context, compounded by the exceptional support granted by international institutions to Russia, explains the cycle of nonpayment, capital flight and fiscal unbalances leading to the dramatic 1998 crisis. We offer an interpretative model of noncompliance, cash-stripping and rational collective nonpayment, which led to the fiscal and banking crisis and ultimately to a complete meltdown. In our view, the banking sector was already insolvent prior to the crisis, and contributed directly and indirectly to it. The last section of the paper puts forward a radical medium-term policy proposal for a stable banking and payment system for Russia. Russia needs to create a basic foundation for savings and intermediation by asset restrictions and market segmentation, crude but effective rules used in all underdeveloped systems to restrain asset stripping and opportunism. Concretely, we propose a cautious extension of deposit insurance away from the monopolistic Sberbank and towards a narrow banking layer. The proposal also proposes to restore charter value in the commercial banking sector.

State ownership - a residual role?

The author reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of state ownership. He argues that a gradual transfer of operational control and financial claims over state assets remains the most desirable goal, but it needs to be paced to avoid regulatory capture, and the capture of the privatization process itself. In addition, the speed of transfer should be timed on the progress in developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which certain residual rights of intervention must be vested. In many countries institutional weakness limits regulatory capacity and reliability, yet the author's conclusion is that in such environments, maintaining state control undermines the very emergence of institutional capacity, and so the balance should tip toward progressively less direct state control. After all, what are"institutions"if not governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomy from both political and private interests? The gradual creation of institutions partially autonomous from political power must become central to the development of an optimal mode of regulatory governance. The author offers some suggestions about creating maximum accountability in regulatory governance, in particular creating an internal control system based on a rotating board representative of users, producers, and civic organizations, to be elected by a process involving frequent reporting and disclosure.Decentralization,National Governance,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,National Governance,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Governance Indicators,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management

The Political Economy of Financial Fragility

While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on enforcement of investor protection, which may be structured so as to block funding for new entrants, or limit their access to refinance after a shock. This forces inefficient default and exit by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen financial fragility. After large external shocks, borrowers from the political elite in very corrupt countries may successfully lobby for weak enforcement, and retain control of collateral. We provide evidence that industry exit rates and profit margins after banking crises are higher in the most corrupt countries.

Resistance to Change

Established firms often fail to maintain leadership following disruptive market shifts. We argue that such firms are more prone to internal resistance. A radical adjustment of assets affects the distribution of employee rents, creating winners and losers. Losers resist large changes when strong customer goodwill cushions the consequences. Partial adaptation may lead winners to depart to form new firms with no goodwill, but no internal resistance.Resistance to Change, Leadership, Adaptation

From Government to Regulatory Governance: Privatization and the Residual Role of the State

This paper reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of public ownership and control. We argue that the transfer of operational control over productive assets to the private sector represents the most desirable governance, due to the inherent difficulty for citizens to constrain political abuse relative to the ability of governments to regulate private activity. However in weak institutional environments the process needs to be structured so as to avoid capture of the regulatory process. The speed of transfer should be timed on the progress in developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which certain residual rights of intervention must be vested. After all, what are “institutions” if not governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomy from both political and private interests? The gradual creation of institutions partially autonomous from political power must become central to the development of an optimal mode of regulatory governance. We advance some suggestions about creating accountability in regulatory governance, in particular creating an internal control system based on a rotating board representative of users, producers and civil society, to be elected by a process involving frequent reporting and disclosure.Regulatory Governance, Privatization

The Circulation of Ideas in Firms and Markets

Novel early stage ideas face uncertainty on the expertise needed to elaborate them, which creates a need to circulate them widely to find a match. Yet as information is not excludable, shared ideas may be stolen, reducing incentives to innovate. Still, in idea-rich environments inventors may share them without contractual protection. Idea density is enhanced by firms ensuring rewards to inventors, while their legal boundaries limit idea leakage. As firms limit idea circulation, the innovative environment involves a symbiotic interaction: firms incubate ideas and allow employees to leave if they cannot find an internal fit; markets allow for wide circulation of ideas until matched and completed; under certain circumstances ideas may be even developed in both firms and markets.Ideas, Innovation, Entrepreneurship, Firm Organization, Start-Ups

Confidence Building in Emerging Stock Markets

Investor confidence is a major determinant of financial integration for emerging markets and their stock prices. We investigate whether privatization also has a significant effect on emerging stock market development through the resolution of policy risk. We argue that a sustained privatization program represents a major test of political commitment to market oriented reforms and to safer private property rights. The evidence suggests that progress in privatization gradually leads to increased confidence as measured by perceived policy risk. Moreover, increased confidence has a strong effect on local market development and excess returns. We conclude that, while liberalization is a necessary condition for market development, the resolution of policy risk resulting from successful privatization has been an important source for the rapid growth of stock markets in emerging economies.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39750/3/wp366.pd

Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency

This paper studies optimal financial contracts and product market competition under a strategic transparency decision. When firms seeking outside finance resort to actively monitored debt in order to commit against opportunistic behaviour, the dominant lender can influence corporate transparency. More transparency about a firm's competitive position has both strategic advantages and disadvantages: in general, transparency results in higher variability of profits and output. Thus lenders prefer less information dissemination, as this protects firms when in a weak competitive position, while equityholders prefer more disclosure to maximize profitability when in a strong position. We show that bank-controlled firms will be opaque, while shareholder- run firms prefer more transparency. In fact, we can predict a clustering of characteristics associated with bank dominance: opaqueness, low variability of profits, slightly reduced average profits, uncertainty about assets in place, and relatively high financing needs all should be observed jointly for bank controlled firms.corporate governance; transparency; bank finance; product market competition; capital structure